The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
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Publication:4145337
DOI10.2307/1913950zbMath0367.90005OpenAlexW2068548219MaRDI QIDQ4145337
Publication date: 1977
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/193.pdf
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