The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance

Cited in

(54)

Expected utility consistent extensions of preferences
Choosers as extension axioms
Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
On the extension of preferences over a set to the power set: An axiomatic characterization of a quasi-ordering
Manipulation and the Pareto rule
Strategic manipulation and the use of individual decision rules
Multivalued social choice functions and strategic manipulation with counterthreats
Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules
Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons
Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
Weakly implementable social choice rules
Sophisticated voting with information for two voting functions
Uncertainty aversion in nonprobabilistic decision models
Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
On the rejectability of the subjective expected utility theory
Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions
Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting
Salvador Barberà
On the manipulation of social choice correspondences
A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
Manipulability of consular election rules
Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes
Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
Ranking opportunity sets on the basis of similarities of preferences: a proposal
Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties
Approval as an intrinsic part of preference
The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives
On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
Social Choice Theory
FUZZY VOTERS, CRISP VOTES
Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions
Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
Strategy-proof interval-social choice correspondences over extended single-peaked domains
Condorcet-consistent choice among three candidates
Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
An extension of May's theorem to three alternatives: axiomatizing Minimax voting
Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings
On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives
Extending an order on a set to the power set: Some remarks on Kannai and Peleg's approach
An axiomatic characterization of the lexicographic maximin extension of an ordering over a set to the power set
Median-based extensions of an ordering over a set to the power set: An axiomatic characterization
Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations

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