The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance

Cited in

(54)

Sophisticated voting with information for two voting functions
Social Choice Theory
Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules
Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
FUZZY VOTERS, CRISP VOTES
Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
Approval as an intrinsic part of preference
Manipulation and the Pareto rule
Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting
Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions
On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives
Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
Strategic manipulation and the use of individual decision rules
Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
On the manipulation of social choice correspondences
On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
An extension of May's theorem to three alternatives: axiomatizing Minimax voting
An axiomatic characterization of the lexicographic maximin extension of an ordering over a set to the power set
Expected utility consistent extensions of preferences
Multivalued social choice functions and strategic manipulation with counterthreats
A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
Salvador Barberà
Extending an order on a set to the power set: Some remarks on Kannai and Peleg's approach
Median-based extensions of an ordering over a set to the power set: An axiomatic characterization
On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives
Choosers as extension axioms
On the rejectability of the subjective expected utility theory
Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes
Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations
Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties
Weakly implementable social choice rules
Ranking opportunity sets on the basis of similarities of preferences: a proposal
On the extension of preferences over a set to the power set: An axiomatic characterization of a quasi-ordering
Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions
Manipulability of consular election rules
Strategy-proof interval-social choice correspondences over extended single-peaked domains
Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
Condorcet-consistent choice among three candidates
Uncertainty aversion in nonprobabilistic decision models
Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings
Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons

This page was built for publication: The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4145337)