The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
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Publication:4145337
Cited in
(52)- Sophisticated voting with information for two voting functions
- Social Choice Theory
- Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
- Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules
- Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
- FUZZY VOTERS, CRISP VOTES
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
- Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
- The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
- Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
- Approval as an intrinsic part of preference
- Manipulation and the Pareto rule
- Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting
- Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions
- On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives
- Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
- Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
- Strategic manipulation and the use of individual decision rules
- Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
- On the manipulation of social choice correspondences
- On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- An axiomatic characterization of the lexicographic maximin extension of an ordering over a set to the power set
- Expected utility consistent extensions of preferences
- Multivalued social choice functions and strategic manipulation with counterthreats
- A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
- Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
- Salvador Barberà
- Extending an order on a set to the power set: Some remarks on Kannai and Peleg's approach
- Median-based extensions of an ordering over a set to the power set: An axiomatic characterization
- On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives
- Choosers as extension axioms
- On the rejectability of the subjective expected utility theory
- Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes
- Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations
- Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
- A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
- Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
- Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties
- Weakly implementable social choice rules
- Ranking opportunity sets on the basis of similarities of preferences: a proposal
- On the extension of preferences over a set to the power set: An axiomatic characterization of a quasi-ordering
- Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions
- Manipulability of consular election rules
- Strategy-proof interval-social choice correspondences over extended single-peaked domains
- Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
- Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
- Uncertainty aversion in nonprobabilistic decision models
- Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
- Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings
- Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons
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