Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings
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Publication:796424
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(83)90052-5zbMATH Open0543.90006OpenAlexW1968628355MaRDI QIDQ796424FDOQ796424
Authors: Taradas Bandyopadhyay 
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(83)90052-5
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Cites Work
- Social choice and individual values
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- On Schwartz's rule
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
- On a class of strictly nonmanipulable collective choice rules
- Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
- Manipulation of social decision functions
- Manipulation and the Pareto rule
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (3)
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