Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(83)90052-5MaRDI QIDQ796424zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Taradas Bandyopadhyay

Publication date 1983

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(83)90052-5

zbMATH Keywords

votingresolutenesslinear sincere preference orderingsmanipulability of group decision functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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• Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898540

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835696 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3635767 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Manipulation and the Pareto rule
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Manipulation of social choice functions
• Manipulation of social decision functions
• On Schwartz's rule
• On a class of strictly nonmanipulable collective choice rules
• Social choice and individual values
• Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
• Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
• Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance

Cited in

(3)

• Defending against strategic manipulation in uninorm-based multi-agent decision making
• Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions
• Multivalued decision rules and coalitional nonmanipulability. Two possibility theorems

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