Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(83)90052-5zbMath0543.90006OpenAlexW1968628355MaRDI QIDQ796424

Taradas Bandyopadhyay

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(83)90052-5

zbMATH Keywords

votingresolutenesslinear sincere preference orderingsmanipulability of group decision functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Multivalued decision rules and coalitional nonmanipulability. Two possibility theorems ⋮ Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• On a class of strictly nonmanipulable collective choice rules
• Manipulation and the Pareto rule
• Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of social choice functions
• On Schwartz's rule
• Manipulation of social decision functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
• Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

This page was built for publication: Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings