On a class of strictly nonmanipulable collective choice rules

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(83)90078-1MaRDI QIDQ1050239zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Taradas Bandyopadhyay

Publication date 1983

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(83)90078-1

zbMATH Keywords

correspondencemanipulationveto powercollective choice rulecoalitional nonmanipulabilitymisrepresentations of preferencesstrategy proof social choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• Manipulation and the Pareto rule
• Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
• Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules

Cited in

(4)

• Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
• Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings
• Multivalued decision rules and coalitional nonmanipulability. Two possibility theorems
• Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions

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