On a class of strictly nonmanipulable collective choice rules

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(83)90078-1zbMATH Open0512.90007OpenAlexW2016824691MaRDI QIDQ1050239FDOQ1050239

Authors: Taradas Bandyopadhyay 

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(83)90078-1

zbMATH Keywords

correspondencemanipulationveto powercollective choice rulecoalitional nonmanipulabilitymisrepresentations of preferencesstrategy proof social choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
• Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules
• Manipulation and the Pareto rule

Cited In (4)

• Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
• Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions
• Multivalued decision rules and coalitional nonmanipulability. Two possibility theorems
• Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings

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