Multivalued decision rules and coalitional nonmanipulability. Two possibility theorems

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(83)90008-3MaRDI QIDQ374843zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Taradas Bandyopadhyay

Publication date 24 October 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(83)90008-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Recommendations

• Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule
• Manipulation of nonimposed, nonoligarchic, nonbinary group decision rules
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Cites work

• Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings
• Manipulation of social choice functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On a class of strictly nonmanipulable collective choice rules
• On Schwartz's rule
• Social choice and individual values
• Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness

Cited in

(7)

• Manipulation of nonimposed, nonoligarchic, nonbinary group decision rules
• Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
• Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
• Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
• Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule
• Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings
• Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness

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