On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures
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Publication:1908005
DOI10.1007/BF01078983zbMATH Open0845.90021MaRDI QIDQ1908005FDOQ1908005
Publication date: 15 September 1996
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On a Difficulty in the Analysis of Strategic Voting
- Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons
Cited In (8)
- Social choice mechanism under complete information
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
- Defending against strategic manipulation in uninorm-based multi-agent decision making
- Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
- Manipulation of choice (agenda theory)
- Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings
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