On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures

DOI10.1007/BF01078983zbMATH Open0845.90021MaRDI QIDQ1908005FDOQ1908005

Boniface Mbih

Publication date: 15 September 1996

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

dominationplurality ruleadmissible strategiescollective choice mechanismmanipulability results

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of social choice functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On a Difficulty in the Analysis of Strategic Voting
• Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons

Cited In (4)

• Social choice mechanism under complete information
• Defending against strategic manipulation in uninorm-based multi-agent decision making
• Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs
• Title not available (Why is that?)

   Recommendations

• On strategy-proof social choice correspondences 👍 👎
• Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules 👍 👎
• On the manipulation of social choice correspondences 👍 👎
• Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules 👍 👎
• On the degree of manipulability of social choice rules 👍 👎
• On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions 👍 👎
• On strategy-proof social choice correspondences: a comment 👍 👎
• On strategy-proof social choice under categorization 👍 👎
• On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives 👍 👎

This page was built for publication: On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1908005)