On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures
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Publication:1908005
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3635767 (Why is no real title available?)
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- On a Difficulty in the Analysis of Strategic Voting
- Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons
- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
Cited in
(13)- Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
- Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
- Manipulation of choice (agenda theory)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 726886 (Why is no real title available?)
- Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs
- Network topology design to influence the effects of manipulative behaviors in a social choice procedure
- Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings
- Multivalued decision rules and coalitional nonmanipulability. Two possibility theorems
- Social choice mechanism under complete information
- Defending against strategic manipulation in uninorm-based multi-agent decision making
- Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
- On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules
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