Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees

DOI10.1007/BF00433655zbMATH Open0651.90003OpenAlexW2059907161MaRDI QIDQ1106706FDOQ1106706

Bezalel Peleg, Cl. d'Aspremont

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00433655

zbMATH Keywords

existencestrategic manipulationOrdinally Bayesian incentive compatible representationweak games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Efficiency Analysis of Choices Involving Risk
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• On strong representations of games by social choice functions
• Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs

Cited In (21)

• Symmetric reduced-form voting
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
• A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility
• Random matching in the college admissions problem
• Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains
• Matching markets under (in)complete information
• The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
• Ranking committees, income streams or multisets
• Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets
• Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
• Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
• Representation of constitutions under incomplete information
• On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions
• Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible probabilistic voting rules
• Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives
• Some further results on random OBIC rules
• Robust incentive compatibility of voting rules with positively correlated beliefs
• Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
• Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
• On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences

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