Incentives in decentralized random matching markets

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.12.005MaRDI QIDQ2519489zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Joana Pais

Publication date 26 January 2009

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/2627

zbMATH Keywords

matching marketsrandom mechanismsstability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
• Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
• Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
• Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
• Random matching in the college admissions problem
• Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets

Cited in

(16)

• Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
• Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
• Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives
• Strategic disaggregation in matching markets
• Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria
• Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
• Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7626775 (Why is no real title available?)
• Priority Design in Centralized Matching Markets
• Decentralized job matching
• Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents
• Tâtonnement in matching markets
• An experimental study of decentralized matching
• Decentralized college admissions under single application
• A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
• Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries

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