Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules

DOI10.1111/J.1468-0262.2004.00499.XMaRDI QIDQ5473020zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dipjyoti Majumdar, Arunava Sen

Publication date 19 June 2006

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00499.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited in

(34)

• On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions
• Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs
• Symmetric reduced-form voting
• Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
• A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility
• Random matching in the college admissions problem
• Correction to “Incentive‐compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs”
• Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting
• Matching markets under (in)complete information
• Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
• The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
• Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication
• What proportion of sincere voters guarantees efficiency?
• Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets
• Probabilistic Borda rule voting
• Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
• A decomposition of strategy-proofness
• Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs
• Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible probabilistic voting rules
• Some further results on random OBIC rules
• Robust incentive compatibility of voting rules with positively correlated beliefs
• Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view
• Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive-compatible voting rules with correlated belief under betweenness property
• A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
• Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
• Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
• Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules
• On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
• Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
• Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria

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