A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1082128 (Why is no real title available?)
- A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
- Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance
- Iterated strict dominance in general games
- Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
- Rationalizable implementation
- Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
- Virtual Bayesian Implementation
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
Cited in
(8)- Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
- Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information
- Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
- Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
- Rationalizability in general situations
- Time and Nash implementation
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Iterated bounded dominance
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