Continuous virtual implementation: complete information

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102605zbMath1485.91087OpenAlexW4206817788MaRDI QIDQ2668986

Ritesh Jain, Michele Lombardi

Publication date: 9 March 2022

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102605

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgesocial choice rulesvirtual implementationcontinuous implementationuniform-weak topology

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Rationalizable implementation
• Robust implementation in general mechanisms
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• Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
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• Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences
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• Implementation with Near-Complete Information
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality

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