A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
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Publication:5437895
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00751.xzbMath1132.91324OpenAlexW1971238429MaRDI QIDQ5437895
Jonathan Weinstein, Muhamet Yildiz
Publication date: 28 January 2008
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00751.x
robustnessincomplete informationrefinementrationalizabilityhigher-order beliefsdominance solvability
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