Coordination with flexible information acquisition

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.11.017zbMATH Open1330.91022OpenAlexW3125417776MaRDI QIDQ896978FDOQ896978

Authors: N. E. Zubov 

Publication date: 15 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10104738/

Recommendations

• Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games
• Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
• Information acquisition in global games of regime change
• Information Acquisition and Welfare
• Coordination with local information

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gamerational inattentionflexible information acquisition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• Information Acquisition and Welfare
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games
• Information acquisition in global games of regime change

Cited In (17)

• Endogenous quantal response equilibrium
• Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games
• Rational inattention and the monotone likelihood ratio property
• Public disclosure and private information acquisition: a global game approach
• Learning in crowded markets
• The normality assumption in coordination games with flexible information acquisition
• Attention misallocation, social welfare and policy implications
• The price adjustment hazard function: evidence from high inflation periods
• Unrestricted information acquisition
• Information acquisition in global games of regime change
• Rigid pricing and rationally inattentive consumer
• Communication via intermediaries
• Auctions with flexible information acquisition
• A note on rational inattention and rate distortion theory
• Strategic mistakes
• Information, coordination, and market frictions: an introduction
• Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition

This page was built for publication: Coordination with flexible information acquisition

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q896978)