Coordination with flexible information acquisition

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.11.017MaRDI QIDQ896978zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors N. E. Zubov

Publication date 15 December 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10104738/

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gamerational inattentionflexible information acquisition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games
• Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
• Information acquisition in global games of regime change
• Information Acquisition and Welfare
• Coordination with local information

Cites work

• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Information Acquisition and Welfare
• Information acquisition in global games of regime change
• Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information

Cited in

(17)

• Endogenous quantal response equilibrium
• Attention misallocation, social welfare and policy implications
• A note on rational inattention and rate distortion theory
• Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games
• The price adjustment hazard function: evidence from high inflation periods
• Learning in crowded markets
• Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
• Rational inattention and the monotone likelihood ratio property
• Unrestricted information acquisition
• The normality assumption in coordination games with flexible information acquisition
• Information acquisition in global games of regime change
• Public disclosure and private information acquisition: a global game approach
• Information, coordination, and market frictions: an introduction
• Rigid pricing and rationally inattentive consumer
• Strategic mistakes
• Communication via intermediaries
• Auctions with flexible information acquisition

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