Coordination with flexible information acquisition

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.11.017zbMath1330.91022OpenAlexW3125417776MaRDI QIDQ896978

N. E. Zubov

Publication date: 15 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10104738/

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gamerational inattentionflexible information acquisition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (16)

The normality assumption in coordination games with flexible information acquisition ⋮ Attention misallocation, social welfare and policy implications ⋮ Communication via intermediaries ⋮ Auctions with flexible information acquisition ⋮ Strategic mistakes ⋮ Information acquisition in global games of regime change ⋮ Unrestricted information acquisition ⋮ Public disclosure and private information acquisition: a global game approach ⋮ Information, coordination, and market frictions: an introduction ⋮ Rigid pricing and rationally inattentive consumer ⋮ Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games ⋮ Endogenous quantal response equilibrium ⋮ Rational inattention and the monotone likelihood ratio property ⋮ The price adjustment hazard function: evidence from high inflation periods ⋮ A note on rational inattention and rate distortion theory ⋮ Learning in crowded markets

Cites Work

• Information acquisition in global games of regime change
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games
• Information Acquisition and Welfare
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments

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