Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition

DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00515.xzbMath1153.91631MaRDI QIDQ3601191

Christian Hellwig, Laura L. Veldkamp

Publication date: 10 February 2009

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00515.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B44: Economics of information

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