Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
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Publication:3601191
DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00515.xzbMath1153.91631OpenAlexW3021036241MaRDI QIDQ3601191
Christian Hellwig, Laura L. Veldkamp
Publication date: 10 February 2009
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00515.x
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