Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
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Publication:3601191
DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2008.00515.XzbMATH Open1153.91631OpenAlexW3021036241MaRDI QIDQ3601191FDOQ3601191
Authors: Christian Hellwig, Laura L. Veldkamp 
Publication date: 10 February 2009
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00515.x
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Cited In (52)
- Strategic complementarity in games
- Monetary policy and sentiment-driven fluctuations
- Towards data auctions with externalities
- Communication and influence
- Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games
- On the economic value of signals
- A consistent route to randomness
- Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity
- Regime change in large information networks
- Searching for information
- Efficient information acquisition with heterogeneous agents
- Endogenous information acquisition in Bayesian games with strategic complementarities
- Characterizing social value of information
- Learning and firm dynamics in a stochastic equilibrium
- On information aggregation and interim efficiency in networks
- The negative value of private information in illiquid markets
- Endogenous information acquisition and countercyclical uncertainty
- Value‐based distance between information structures
- Information rigidities and asymmetric business cycles
- News media and delegated information choice
- Learning in crowded markets
- The normality assumption in coordination games with flexible information acquisition
- Attention misallocation, social welfare and policy implications
- The predominant role of signal precision in experimental beauty contests
- Unrestricted information acquisition
- Portfolio choice, attention allocation, and price comovement
- Communication with endogenous information acquisition
- Information acquisition in global games of regime change
- Cournot competition and the social value of information
- Information quality and crises in regime-change games
- Information acquisition and welfare in network games
- Short-sale constraints, information acquisition, and asset prices
- On the possibility of Krusell-Smith equilibria
- Rational inattention and public signals
- How equilibrium prices reveal information in a time series model with disparately informed, competitive traders
- On defining ex ante payoffs in games with diffuse prior
- Foundations for optimal inattention
- Information acquisition interactions in two-player quadratic games
- Coordination with flexible information acquisition
- Logit, CES, and rational inattention
- On the role of heuristics -- experimental evidence on inflation dynamics
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study
- The social value of public information with costly information acquisition
- Coordination motives and competition for attention in information markets
- Information, coordination, and market frictions: an introduction
- The social value of public information with convex costs of information acquisition
- Informational feedback between voting and speculative trading
- Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
- Prospect theory and market quality
- Information acquisition and use by networked players
- Information and crowding externalities
- Financial prices and information acquisition in large Cournot markets
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