The normality assumption in coordination games with flexible information acquisition

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105485MaRDI QIDQ2155249zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Alexandros Rigos

Publication date 15 July 2022

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105485

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gamesbeauty contestmisspecified priorsrational inattentionflexible information acquisitionerror amplification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3174732 (Why is no real title available?)
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3068103 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Bayes estimation subject to uncertainty about parameter constraints
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• Coordination with flexible information acquisition
• Discrete Actions in Information-Constrained Decision Problems
• Efficient Use of Information and Social�Value�of�Information
• Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• On the aggregation of information in competitive markets
• Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity

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