The normality assumption in coordination games with flexible information acquisition
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Publication:2155249
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105485zbMATH Open1497.91014OpenAlexW3212943834WikidataQ114665949 ScholiaQ114665949MaRDI QIDQ2155249FDOQ2155249
Publication date: 15 July 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105485
coordination gamesbeauty contestmisspecified priorsrational inattentionflexible information acquisitionerror amplification
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- Coordination with flexible information acquisition
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