Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity
From MaRDI portal
Publication:433153
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.12.011zbMath1242.91077WikidataQ57388179 ScholiaQ57388179MaRDI QIDQ433153
Carolina Manzano, Xavier Vives
Publication date: 13 July 2012
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/151544
hedging; asymmetric information; information acquisition; rational expectations equilibrium; risk exposure; supply information
91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)
91B44: Economics of information
91G99: Actuarial science and mathematical finance
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