Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2010.12.011MaRDI QIDQ433153zbMATHOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Carolina Manzano, Xavier Vives

Publication date 13 July 2012

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/2072/151544

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationhedginginformation acquisitionrational expectations equilibriumrisk exposuresupply information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

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Cites work

• A Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium for Multi-Asset Securities Markets
• Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge
• Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and the Correspondence Principle
• Financial market innovation and security design: An introduction
• How Fast do Rational Agents Learn?
• Information Acquisition in Financial Markets
• Information Markets and the Comovement of Asset Prices
• Introduction to the stability of rational expectations equilibrium
• Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
• Learning and complementarities in speculative attacks
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• On the aggregation of information in competitive markets
• On “Acquisition of Information in Financial Markets”
• Regulating Insider Trading When Investment Matters *

Cited in

(20)

• Financial prices and information acquisition in large Cournot markets
• Information aggregation in a financial market with general signal structure
• Searching for information
• Efficiency in trading markets with multi-dimensional signals
• Information acquisition with heterogeneous valuations
• Rational destabilization in a frictionless market
• Cocktails done right: price competition and welfare when substitutes become complements
• Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
• Information percolation in segmented markets
• The normality assumption in coordination games with flexible information acquisition
• An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals
• Public disclosure and private information acquisition: a global game approach
• Competitive rational expectations equilibria without apology
• Information, coordination, and market frictions: an introduction
• Strategic complementarity in games
• On the relation between private information and non-fundamental volatility
• Snowballing private information
• Reprint of: ``Information percolation in segmented markets
• Information acquisition, price informativeness, and welfare
• Comments on: ``Government intervention through informed trading in financial markets

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