Rational destabilization in a frictionless market
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Publication:1995315
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Cites work
- A Model of Intertemporal Asset Prices Under Asymmetric Information
- A robust model of bubbles with multidimensional uncertainty
- Aggregation of Information in Large Cournot Markets
- Bubbles and Crashes
- Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading
- Front-running dynamics
- Information aggregation in dynamic markets with strategic traders
- Informed manipulation.
- Insider Trading without Normality
- Price Manipulation and Quasi-Arbitrage
- Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity
- Smart Money, Noise Trading and Stock Price Behaviour
- Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations
- Strategic trading in informationally complex environments
- The high-frequency trading arms race: frequent batch auctions as a market design response
- The more we know about the fundamental, the less we agree on the price
- What is the optimal trading frequency in financial markets?
Cited in
(12)- Activism, strategic trading, and liquidity
- Liquidity drops
- Dampening effect and market efficiency
- Price manipulation, dynamic informed trading, and the uniqueness of equilibrium in sequential trading
- Manipulation and the Allocational Role of Prices
- Dynamic signaling and market breakdown
- More hedging instruments may destabilize markets
- Can public information promote market stability?
- Price distortions under coarse reasoning with frequent trade
- Snowballing private information
- A dynamic strategy of the informed trader with market manipulation
- Private Information and High-Frequency Stochastic Volatility
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