An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2019.104938zbMath1426.91135OpenAlexW2971537110MaRDI QIDQ2334127

Tibor Heumann

Publication date: 7 November 2019

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104938

zbMATH Keywords

multi-dimensional signalsinformation aggregationascending auction\textit{ex post} equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts

Cites Work

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