An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals
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Publication:2334127
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2019.104938zbMath1426.91135OpenAlexW2971537110MaRDI QIDQ2334127
Publication date: 7 November 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104938
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Cites Work
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