Bad news can be good news: early dropouts in an English auction with multi-dimensional signals

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2006.12.001zbMATH Open1255.91160OpenAlexW2092201639MaRDI QIDQ1934086FDOQ1934086

Authors: Dan Levin, James Peck, Lixin Ye 

Publication date: 28 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.12.001

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zbMATH Keywords

reversalEnglish auctionmulti-dimensional signals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Multidimensional private value auctions
• Efficient Auctions
• Asymmetric information in a competitive market game: Reexamining the implications of rational expectations
• An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations

Cited In (2)

• Investment dynamics with common and private values
• An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals

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