Bad news can be good news: early dropouts in an English auction with multi-dimensional signals

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2006.12.001MaRDI QIDQ1934086zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dan Levin, James Peck, Lixin Ye

Publication date 28 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

English auctionmulti-dimensional signalsreversal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• An “Alternating Recognition” Model of English Auctions
• The effectiveness of English auctions.
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Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
• Asymmetric information in a competitive market game: Reexamining the implications of rational expectations
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Multidimensional private value auctions

Cited in

(2)

• An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals
• Investment dynamics with common and private values

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