Bad news can be good news: early dropouts in an English auction with multi-dimensional signals
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1934086
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2006.12.001zbMath1255.91160MaRDI QIDQ1934086
Dan Levin, James Peck, Lixin Ye
Publication date: 28 January 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.12.001
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Related Items
Investment dynamics with common and private values, An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals
Cites Work
- An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
- Asymmetric information in a competitive market game: Reexamining the implications of rational expectations
- Multidimensional private value auctions
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations