Efficient Auctions
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Publication:4495443
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Cited in
(93)- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
- A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types
- Multiagent system simulations of signal averaging in English auctions with two-dimensional value signals
- Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
- Inefficient ex-post equilibria in efficient auctions
- Asymmetric English auctions.
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions.
- An efficient ascending auction for private valuations
- Efficiency of lowest-unmatched price auctions
- English auctions with ensuing risks and heterogeneous bidders
- Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
- Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions
- Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
- Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings
- Information revelation and efficiency in auctions
- Implementing the efficient auction: initial results from the lab
- VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities
- Bad news can be good news: early dropouts in an English auction with multi-dimensional signals
- Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
- Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments
- Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
- Merger negotiations and ex-post regret
- Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
- Evidence reading mechanisms
- An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals
- Index-wise comparative statics
- Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
- Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values
- Efficiency versus optimality in procurement
- Optimal combinatorial mechanism design
- Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences
- Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions
- Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations
- Implementation in an interdependent value framework
- Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
- Contingent payments in selection contests
- Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty
- Auctions with interdependence and SOS: improved approximation
- Prior-free clock auctions for bidders with interdependent values
- Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
- Auction design for the efficient allocation of service capacity under congestion
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
- Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities
- Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty
- Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
- Optimal search, learning and implementation
- Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
- A model of access in the absence of markets
- Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability
- Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
- Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization
- Optimal and Efficient Parametric Auctions
- Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
- Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima
- The limits of ex post implementation without transfers
- Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments
- Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities
- Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge
- Better approximation for interdependent SOS valuations
- On efficiency of the English auction
- The robustness of robust implementation
- Second best efficiency and the English auction
- Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values
- On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values
- Save, spend, or give? A model of housing, family insurance, and savings in old age
- Hazed and confused: the effect of air pollution on dementia
- IQ, expectations, and choice
- Optimal feedback in contests
- Unemployment insurance in macroeconomic stabilization
- A welfare analysis of occupational licensing in U.S. states
- A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions
- A more credible approach to parallel trends
- Testing the production approach to markup estimation
- Stratification trees for adaptive randomisation in randomised controlled trials
- Leveraging e-waste recycling via auctions with dual responsibilities
- Locally robust implementation and its limits
- Strategic foundations of efficient rational expectations
- Auctioning off a non-rivalrous good with interference
- Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs
- An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
- Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information
- Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights
- Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types
- On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions
- Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule
- Ex post implementation
- Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials
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