On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0891-6zbMATH Open1341.91073OpenAlexW2031130905WikidataQ59429383 ScholiaQ59429383MaRDI QIDQ892845FDOQ892845

Authors Marc Schröder, Dries Vermeulen, Hans Peters 

Publication date 12 November 2015

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0891-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5852793 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53233 (Why is no real title available?)
• An Efficient Auction
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• Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
• Efficient Auctions
• Ex post implementation
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
• On effectivity functions of game forms
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
• Representation of constitutions under incomplete information
• Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
• The Limits of ex post Implementation

Cited in

(4)

• Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models
• Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey
• Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization
• Representation of effectivity functions in coalition proof Nash equilibrium: a complete character\-ization

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