On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0891-6zbMATH Open1341.91073OpenAlexW2031130905WikidataQ59429383 ScholiaQ59429383MaRDI QIDQ892845FDOQ892845

Marc Schröder, Dries Vermeulen, Hans Peters

Publication date: 12 November 2015

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0891-6

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• Efficient Auctions
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• An Efficient Auction
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Ex post implementation
• Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
• Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
• Representation of constitutions under incomplete information
• Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
• On effectivity functions of game forms

Cited In (3)

• Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey
• Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization
• Representation of effectivity functions in coalition proof Nash equilibrium: a complete character\-ization

Uses Software

• JBool

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