Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
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Publication:1381343
DOI10.1007/s003550050092zbMath0894.90009OpenAlexW2093518107MaRDI QIDQ1381343
Publication date: 17 March 1998
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050092
Related Items (25)
ON THE COMPLEXITY OF COALITIONAL REASONING ⋮ Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization ⋮ On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions ⋮ Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey ⋮ Binary effectivity rules ⋮ Regulating competing coalitions: a logic for socially optimal group choices ⋮ Directed graphical structure, Nash equilibrium, and potential games ⋮ On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions ⋮ The structure of unstable power mechanisms ⋮ Combining rights and welfarism: a new approach to intertemporal evaluation of social alternatives ⋮ The representation of alienable and inalienable rights: Games in transition function form ⋮ Representation of constitutions under incomplete information ⋮ Book review of: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters, Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions ⋮ Consistent rights on property spaces ⋮ Implementation by mediated equilibrium ⋮ Decomposing complete edge-chromatic graphs and hypergraphs. Revisited ⋮ A stability index for local effectivity functions ⋮ On effectivity functions of game forms ⋮ Rights Revisited, and Limited ⋮ Qualitative criteria of admissibility for enforced agreements ⋮ Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models ⋮ Tight and effectively rectangular game forms: A Nash solvable class ⋮ A new game equivalence, its logic and algebra ⋮ Limited Rights as Partial Veto and Sen’s Impossibility Theorem ⋮ Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
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