Limited Rights as Partial Veto and Sen’s Impossibility Theorem

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-79832-3_1MaRDI QIDQ5506525zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Maurice Salles

Publication date 28 January 2009

Published in Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79832-3_1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
• Choice, welfare, and measurement
• Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
• Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44307 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
• Interval graphs and interval orders
• Invoking a Cartesian product structure on social states. New resolutions of Sen's and Gibbard's impossibility theorems
• Negative externalities and Sen's liberalism theorem
• Semiorders and collective choice
• Social choice and individual values

Cited in

(14)

• Justice, liberty, unanimity and the axioms of identity
• On the strategic inconsistency of the meta-rights approach
• Between liberalism and democracy.
• Sen cycles and externalities
• Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
• Negative externalities and Sen's liberalism theorem
• Rights revisited, and limited
• Are Individual Rights Possible?
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910770 (Why is no real title available?)
• ``The liberal paradox: A generalization by D. Kelsey
• ``The liberal paradox: A generalization by D. Kelsey
• Two impossibility results for social choice under individual indifference intransitivity
• Sen's theorem: geometric proof, new interpretations
• Individual powers and social consent: an axiomatic approach

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