General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
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(80)- On the computability of quasi-transitive binary social choice rules in an infinite society and the halting problem
- Efficient and binary consensus functions on transitively valued relations
- Acyclic choice and group veto
- From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences
- New problems in the general choice theory
- Utility and the individual: An analysis of internal conflicts
- Some impossibility results with domain restrictions
- Fuzzy preferences and social choice
- Some further results on nonbinary social choice
- The structure of neutral monotonic social functions
- Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
- Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle
- Arrovian theorems with private alternatives domains and selfish individuals
- Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
- Aggregation of preferences: a review
- Symmetric social choices and collective rationality
- Arrow's theorem: Unusual domains and extended codomains
- Social choice rules and real-valued representations
- Quasitransitive intergenerational choice for economic environments
- A general possibility theorem for group decision rules with Pareto- transitivity
- Dictators on blocks: Generalizations of social choice impossibility theorems
- Weak path independence
- Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
- Manipulation of social decision functions
- Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions
- Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules
- Fuzzy aggregation in economic environments: I. Quantitative fuzziness, public goods and monotonicity assumptions.
- A trade-off result for preference revelation
- Incomplete decision-making and Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence
- A rote on impossibility theorems and seniority rules
- Rationality, path independence, and the power structure
- The median procedure in the semilattice of orders
- Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
- Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
- Salvador Barberà
- Allan Gibbard
- Stable preference aggregation with infinite population
- Reflections on Arrow's research program of social choice theory
- Arrow's decisive coalitions
- A note on Murakami's theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle
- An introduction to Allan Gibbard's oligarchy theorem paper
- Unanimity, anonymity, and infinite population
- On some oligarchy results when social preference is fuzzy
- Quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent relations
- Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
- Vetoer and tie-making group theorems for indifference-transitive aggregation rules
- Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings
- The launching of `social choice and welfare' and the creation of the `Society for Social Choice and Welfare'
- Even-chance lotteries in social choice theory
- Fuzzy strict preference and social choice
- Independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of voting
- Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties
- Limits of acyclic voting
- Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
- Weak independence and the Pareto principle
- Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited
- Conditions on social-preference cycles
- On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
- Social Choice Theory
- A systematic approach to the construction of non-empty choice sets
- Limited Rights as Partial Veto and Sen’s Impossibility Theorem
- Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability
- Social choice and individual values in the electronic republic
- Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions
- Vetoing: social, logical and mathematical aspects
- Acyclic and positive responsive social choice with infinite individuals. An alternative `invisible dictator' theorem
- Can equity be purchased at the expense of efficiency? An axiomatic inquiry
- The structure of social decision functions
- Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions
- On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice
- Aggregation of preferences: The fuzzy case
- Joint desirability foundations of social choice and opinion pooling
- Oligarchies in spatial environments
- Candidate stability and voting correspondences
- Intransitive social strict preference and the Arrow theorem
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- Arrovian theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods
- Abstract Arrowian aggregation
- Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
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