Limits of acyclic voting

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.02.004MaRDI QIDQ281385zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John Duggan

Publication date 11 May 2016

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.004

zbMATH Keywords

votingacyclicityArrow's theorempositive responsivenesspreference aggregation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Acyclic social choice from finite sets
• Acyclic choice and group veto
• Acyclic Choice without the Pareto Principle
• From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences
• Acyclicity and decisiveness structures

Cites work

• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
• Acyclicity and the dispersion of the veto power
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
• Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures
• k-Monotone Social Decision Functions and the Veto

Cited in

(11)

• Acyclic social choice from finite sets
• Limited Rights as Partial Veto and Sen’s Impossibility Theorem
• Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters
• Strong and weak acyclicity in iterative voting
• Acyclic choice and group veto
• Ultimate fate of constrained voters
• Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom
• A procedural condition necessary and sufficient for cyclic social preference
• Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction
• From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences
• An algebraic approach to revealed preference

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