Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
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Cited in
(29)- Acyclic choice and group veto
- Utility and the individual: An analysis of internal conflicts
- On the core of voting games
- A new informational base for social choice
- Social choice rules and real-valued representations
- Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules
- Indecisive choice theory
- A note on the core of voting games
- Product filters, acyclicity and suzumura consistency
- Rationality, path independence, and the power structure
- Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters
- John A. Weymark
- On some oligarchy results when social preference is fuzzy
- Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
- Vetoer and tie-making group theorems for indifference-transitive aggregation rules
- Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings
- Collective choice rules with social maximality
- Limits of acyclic voting
- Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited
- Conditions on social-preference cycles
- Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions
- Structure of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules with quasi-transitive individual preferences
- An axiomatic characterization of split cycle
- When is it (im)possible to respect all individuals' preferences under uncertainty?
- The structure of social decision functions
- Hierarchies of power in non-binary social choice
- On \(\mathcal S\)-independence and Hansson's external independence
- Sequential path independence and social choice
- Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations
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