On \(\mathcal S\)-independence and Hansson's external independence
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Publication:892988
DOI10.1007/s11238-014-9468-6zbMath1377.91087OpenAlexW2043471611MaRDI QIDQ892988
Publication date: 13 November 2015
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9468-6
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- Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?
- Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
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