On S-independence and Hansson's external independence

DOI10.1007/S11238-014-9468-6MaRDI QIDQ892988zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dan Qin

Publication date 13 November 2015

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9468-6

zbMATH Keywords

Arrow's impossibility theoremexternal similarity independenceindependence condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited
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• Independent Decisiveness and the Arrow theorem
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Cites work

• Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
• Acyclic choice and group veto
• Acyclicity and the dispersion of the veto power
• Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited
• Information and preference aggregation
• Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives
• Social choice and individual values
• Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives
• The independence condition in the theory of social choice
• The informational basis of the theory of fair allocation

Cited in

(2)

• Remarks on external elements in independence spaces
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited

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