The independence condition in the theory of social choice
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1213375
DOI10.1007/BF00133397zbMath0295.90006OpenAlexW2040074158MaRDI QIDQ1213375
Publication date: 1973
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00133397
Related Items (26)
Fair compensation with different social concerns for forgiveness ⋮ Two criteria for social decisions ⋮ Bounded response of aggregated preferences ⋮ Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions ⋮ On \(\mathcal S\)-independence and Hansson's external independence ⋮ Binary social welfare functions ⋮ Comparison and choice ⋮ Length and cycle equalization ⋮ Compensating the dead ⋮ Social preferences for the evaluation of procedures ⋮ Money-metric utilitarianism ⋮ On relative egalitarianism ⋮ Health, fairness and taxation ⋮ Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited ⋮ Fair social orderings ⋮ Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making ⋮ Positionalist voting functions ⋮ The news of the death of welfare economics is greatly exaggerated ⋮ How relevant are irrelevant alternatives? ⋮ Welfare inequalities and Rawlsian axiomatics ⋮ On Schwartz's rule ⋮ Neutrality and independence of alternatives in group decisions ⋮ Manipulation of social choice rules by strategic nomination of candidates ⋮ Equity- and inequity-type Borda rules ⋮ Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces? ⋮ Criteria for judging the rationality of decisions in the presence of vague alternatives
Cites Work
This page was built for publication: The independence condition in the theory of social choice
