Manipulation of social choice rules by strategic nomination of candidates

DOI10.1007/BF00126341zbMATH Open0393.90005MaRDI QIDQ1252142FDOQ1252142

Authors: Donald E. Campbell 

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

VotingSocial Choice RulesStrategic Nomination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• Positionalist voting functions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Rational Selection of Decision Functions
• The independence condition in the theory of social choice
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Democratic preference functions
• Realization of Choice Functions

Cited In (4)

• A unifying impossibility theorem
• Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures
• Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
• On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results

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