Manipulation of social choice rules by strategic nomination of candidates

DOI10.1007/BF00126341MaRDI QIDQ1252142zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Donald E. Campbell

Publication date 1979

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

VotingSocial Choice RulesStrategic Nomination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3303831 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Democratic preference functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Positionalist voting functions
• Rational Selection of Decision Functions
• Realization of Choice Functions
• Social choice and individual values
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The independence condition in the theory of social choice
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

Cited in

(4)

• A unifying impossibility theorem
• Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures
• Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
• On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results

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