Positionalist voting functions

DOI10.1007/BF00133396zbMath0295.90005MaRDI QIDQ1213373

Peter Gaerdenfors

Publication date: 1973

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to social sciences (62P25) Decision theory (91B06)

Related Items (23)

Defining the Borda count in a linguistic decision making context ⋮ The costs of implementing the majority principle: The golden voting rule ⋮ An axiomatic characterization of the Borda mean rule ⋮ Two characterizations of the dense rank ⋮ Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited ⋮ A general scoring rule ⋮ Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations ⋮ Another perspective on Borda's paradox ⋮ On the probability of observing Borda's paradox ⋮ Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context ⋮ How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election ⋮ Manipulation of social choice functions ⋮ How relevant are irrelevant alternatives? ⋮ Welfare inequalities and Rawlsian axiomatics ⋮ Sophisticated voting with information for two voting functions ⋮ Neutrality and independence of alternatives in group decisions ⋮ Manipulation of social choice rules by strategic nomination of candidates ⋮ A note on manipulability of large voting schemes ⋮ Equity- and inequity-type Borda rules ⋮ Social Choice Theory ⋮ On the information about individual utilities used in social choice ⋮ Duplication in OWA-Generated Positional Aggregation Rules ⋮ Is majority consistency possible?

Cites Work

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• The independence condition in the theory of social choice

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