Positionalist voting functions
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Publication:1213373
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
- Social choice and individual values
- The independence condition in the theory of social choice
Cited in
(26)- On the information about individual utilities used in social choice
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- How relevant are irrelevant alternatives?
- Welfare inequalities and Rawlsian axiomatics
- Sophisticated voting with information for two voting functions
- Neutrality and independence of alternatives in group decisions
- Manipulation of social choice rules by strategic nomination of candidates
- Equity- and inequity-type Borda rules
- Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations
- Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context
- Defining the Borda count in a linguistic decision making context
- An axiomatic characterization of the Borda mean rule
- How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
- Is majority consistency possible?
- Duplication in OWA-generated positional aggregation rules
- A general scoring rule
- Social Choice Theory
- Two characterizations of the dense rank
- Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited
- Consistent social ranking solutions
- Another perspective on Borda's paradox
- A positional analysis of ranking procedures
- Characterizing competition ranks within a comprehensive family of position operators
- A note on manipulability of large voting schemes
- The costs of implementing the majority principle: The golden voting rule
- On the probability of observing Borda's paradox
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