The costs of implementing the majority principle: The golden voting rule

DOI10.1007/S00199-006-0083-9zbMATH Open1109.91338OpenAlexW2081876244MaRDI QIDQ868423FDOQ868423

Authors: Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan 

Publication date: 5 March 2007

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0083-9

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zbMATH Keywords

Scoring rulesMajority decisivenessMajority principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Positionalist voting functions
• A characterization result for the plurality rule
• Characterizations of scoring methods for preference aggregation
• The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability
• Approval voting reconsidered
• The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment
• Basic Geometry of Voting
• The Borda dictionary
• The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result
• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations
• Scoring rules: an alternative parameterization
• Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. I: Pairwise votes

Cited In (3)

• Is majority consistency possible?
• Preferences for harmony and minority voting
• Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach

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