Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cites work
Cited in
(50)- When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
- Introduction to political science
- Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
- Electoral institutions with impressionable voters
- Poisson voting games under proportional rule
- Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
- A theory of strategic voting with non-instrumental motives
- A Condorcet jury theorem for large \textit{Poisson} elections with multiple alternatives
- Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting
- Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections
- Weak undominance in scoring rule elections
- Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
- Piercing numbers in approval voting
- Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation
- On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games
- Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment
- Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games
- The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games
- Qualified voting systems
- The strategic sincerity of approval voting
- The two-party system under alternative voting procedures
- Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
- Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules
- The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization
- Approval quorums dominate participation quorums
- The basic approval voting game
- Approval Voting in Large Electorates
- \textit{In Silico} voting experiments
- Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting
- Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting
- Policy moderation and endogenous candidacy in approval voting elections
- Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
- Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule
- Approval voting and scoring rules with common values
- Strategic stability in Poisson games
- Manipulation in elections with uncertain preferences
- Who Wins and Loses Under Approval Voting? An Analysis of Large Elections
- Multicandidate elections: aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory
- Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization
- Poisson-Cournot games
- On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
- Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system: An experiment
- The wasted vote phenomenon with uncertain voter population
- Full information equivalence in large elections
- Poisson search
- Voter coordination in elections: a case for approval voting
- Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates
- BAR Nash equilibrium and application to blockchain design
- Bargaining through approval
- The costs of implementing the majority principle: The golden voting rule
This page was built for publication: Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1599834)
