The basic approval voting game
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Publication:2829681
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_8zbMATH Open1348.91099OpenAlexW152666116MaRDI QIDQ2829681FDOQ2829681
Authors: Jean-François Laslier, M. Remzi Sanver 
Publication date: 8 November 2016
Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_8
Recommendations
Social choice (91B14) Applications of game theory (91A80) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Voting theory (91B12)
Cites Work
- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
- Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
- Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
- Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
- Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
- Approval voting: three examples
- When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
- Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment
Cited In (10)
- Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
- Who Wins and Loses Under Approval Voting? An Analysis of Large Elections
- Simple games with many effective voters
- Approval as an intrinsic part of preference
- Piercing numbers in approval voting
- Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: an impossibility result
- Bargaining through approval
- Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
- Threshold voting leads to type-revelation
- Equilibria in Doodle polls under three tie-breaking rules
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