The basic approval voting game

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_8MaRDI QIDQ2829681zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jean-François Laslier, M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date 8 November 2016

Published in Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Applications of game theory (91A80) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Handbook on approval voting
• Approval voting: three examples
• The strategic sincerity of approval voting
• Who Wins and Loses Under Approval Voting? An Analysis of Large Elections
• Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting

Cites work

• Approval voting: three examples
• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
• Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment
• Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?

Cited in

(10)

• Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
• Who Wins and Loses Under Approval Voting? An Analysis of Large Elections
• Simple games with many effective voters
• Approval as an intrinsic part of preference
• Piercing numbers in approval voting
• Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: an impossibility result
• Bargaining through approval
• Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Threshold voting leads to type-revelation
• Equilibria in Doodle polls under three tie-breaking rules

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