Threshold voting leads to type-revelation

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.10.003MaRDI QIDQ1667910zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matías Núñez

Publication date 31 August 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.10.003

zbMATH Keywords

approval votingcardinal utilitiesstrategy proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• Bargaining through approval
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738 (Why is no real title available?)
• Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
• Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
• Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
• The basic approval voting game
• Voting systems that combine approval and preference

Cited in

(1)

• Reaching consensus through approval bargaining

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