Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
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Publication:2013345
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.002zbMath1393.91057OpenAlexW2607393501MaRDI QIDQ2013345
Jean-François Laslier, Matías Núñez, Carlos González Pimienta
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.002
Related Items (3)
Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences ⋮ A solution to the two-person implementation problem ⋮ Piercing numbers in approval voting
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