Reaching consensus through approval bargaining

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.002zbMath1393.91057OpenAlexW2607393501MaRDI QIDQ2013345

Jean-François Laslier, Matías Núñez, Carlos González Pimienta

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.002

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingapproval votingpartial honestyconsensual equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences ⋮ A solution to the two-person implementation problem ⋮ Piercing numbers in approval voting

Cites Work

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• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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