Reaching consensus through approval bargaining

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.04.002MaRDI QIDQ2013345zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jean-François Laslier, Matías Núñez, Carlos Pimienta

Publication date 17 August 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.002

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingapproval votingpartial honestyconsensual equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4060392 (Why is no real title available?)
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5240213 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
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• Bargaining through approval
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• Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
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• Implementation with evidence
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
• Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
• The strategic sincerity of approval voting
• Threshold voting leads to type-revelation
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

Cited in

(10)

• Piercing numbers in approval voting
• Reaching a consensus
• Approaching consensus can be delicate when positions harden
• Bargaining through approval
• A solution to the two-person implementation problem
• Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
• Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
• The Building Blocks of Consensus
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4058837 (Why is no real title available?)
• Strategic consensus

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