Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4060392 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 54098 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5240213 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- A derivative-coderivative inclusion in second-order nonsmooth analysis
- Bargaining through approval
- Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Handbook on approval voting
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Implementation with evidence
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
- Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- The strategic sincerity of approval voting
- Threshold voting leads to type-revelation
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
Cited in
(10)- Piercing numbers in approval voting
- Reaching a consensus
- Approaching consensus can be delicate when positions harden
- Bargaining through approval
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
- Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
- The Building Blocks of Consensus
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4058837 (Why is no real title available?)
- Strategic consensus
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