Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.10.002MaRDI QIDQ863279zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Juan Camilo Gómez

Publication date 26 January 2007

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.10.002

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencybargainingdistortion games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• Publication:4724439
• Self-optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games
• Efficient performance in two agent bargaining
• Manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism
• Bargaining solutions without the expected utility hypothesis

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4141836 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 54098 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226098 (Why is no real title available?)
• A characterization of polyhedral market games
• A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation
• Concavifiability and constructions of concave utility functions
• Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
• Distortion of preferences, income distribution, and the case for a linear income tax
• Manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism
• Misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining: Pure exchange and public good economies
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Power and Taxes
• Self-optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games
• The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
• The bargaining problem
• The manipulability of the Shapley-value
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

Cited in

(7)

• Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
• Predicting behavior in unstructured bargaining with a probability distribution
• Manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism
• Efficient performance in two agent bargaining
• Misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining: Pure exchange and public good economies
• Self-optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games
• Strategic bargaining and full efficiency

This page was built for publication: Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q863279)