The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
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Publication:3217868
DOI10.2307/2297433zbMath0554.90010OpenAlexW2081158790WikidataQ59973102 ScholiaQ59973102MaRDI QIDQ3217868
Publication date: 1984
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297433
Nash equilibriamanipulabilityresource allocation mechanismsWalrasian correspondencemanipulation games
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