The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms

DOI10.2307/2297433zbMATH Open0554.90010OpenAlexW2081158790WikidataQ59973102 ScholiaQ59973102MaRDI QIDQ3217868FDOQ3217868

Authors: William Thomson 

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297433

Recommendations

• Reversal of asymmetries of allocation mechanisms under manipulation
• The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation
• New variable-population paradoxes for resource allocation
• The manipulability of the Shapley-value
• Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriamanipulabilityresource allocation mechanismsWalrasian correspondencemanipulation games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cited In (27)

• Credible implementation
• Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods
• Are incentives against economic justice?
• Manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism
• Core is manipulable via segmentation
• Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
• Coalition formation in games of fair division
• Let them cheat!
• Manipulation of the Walrasian mechanism in production economies with unbounded short-selling
• Misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining: Pure exchange and public good economies
• Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
• Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers
• Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
• Games of manipulation in marriage problems
• Self-optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games
• The manipulability of the Shapley-value
• The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation
• Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
• Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
• Non-manipulability vs. individual rationality in a permit sharing problem
• Reversal of asymmetries of allocation mechanisms under manipulation
• New variable-population paradoxes for resource allocation
• Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
• Strategy-proof risk sharing
• Connectedness of the set of manipulable equilibria
• Manipulation of the Walrasian mechanism in production economies with unbounded short-selling
• Communication requirements and strategic mechanisms for market organization

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