Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.03.006zbMATH Open1330.91111OpenAlexW2071460483MaRDI QIDQ894069FDOQ894069
Publication date: 23 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.006
Recommendations
bounded rationalityindivisible goodsequal-income competitive social choice functionssincere and sophisticated agents
Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
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Cited In (5)
- The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems
- Equitable rent division on a soft budget
- Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
- A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget
- Divide and compromise
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