Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.03.006MaRDI QIDQ894069zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rodrigo A. Velez

Publication date 23 November 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.006

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalityindivisible goodsequal-income competitive social choice functionssincere and sophisticated agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• Are incentives against economic justice?
• Budget balance, fairness, and minimal manipulability
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• Fairness and externalities
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• Let them cheat!
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• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
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• Role of honesty in full implementation
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• Strategic communication with lying costs
• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
• The manipulability of the Shapley-value

Cited in

(5)

• The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems
• Equitable rent division on a soft budget
• Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
• A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget
• Divide and compromise

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