Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint
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Recommendations
- Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains
- An algorithm for envy-free allocations in an economy with indivisible objects and money
- Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation
- Toward Natural Implementation
- Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3670138 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Bidding for envy-freeness: a procedural approach to \(n\)-player fair-division problems
- Games of fair division
- Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
- Room assignment-rent division: a market approach
- The assignment game. I: The core
Cited in
(9)- TWO EXAMPLES IN A MARKET WITH TWO TYPES OF INDIVISIBLE GOOD
- The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems
- Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods
- Are incentives against economic justice?
- Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
- Let them cheat!
- Equitable rent division on a soft budget
- Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
- Divide and compromise
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