Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint
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Publication:2483121
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.01.011zbMATH Open1135.91369OpenAlexW2099956875MaRDI QIDQ2483121FDOQ2483121
Authors: Helmuts Āzacis 
Publication date: 28 April 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.011
Recommendations
- Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains
- An algorithm for envy-free allocations in an economy with indivisible objects and money
- Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation
- Toward Natural Implementation
- Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
Cites Work
- The assignment game. I: The core
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Room assignment-rent division: a market approach
- Games of fair division
- Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Bidding for envy-freeness: a procedural approach to \(n\)-player fair-division problems
Cited In (9)
- The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems
- Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods
- Are incentives against economic justice?
- Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
- Let them cheat!
- Equitable rent division on a soft budget
- Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
- TWO EXAMPLES IN A MARKET WITH TWO TYPES OF INDIVISIBLE GOOD
- Divide and compromise
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