Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.011zbMath1135.91369OpenAlexW2099956875MaRDI QIDQ2483121

Helmuts Āzacis

Publication date: 28 April 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.011

zbMATH Keywords

implementationstrong Nash equilibriumenvy-freenessindivisible goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items

Divide and compromise ⋮ Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market ⋮ Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Equitable rent division on a soft budget ⋮ Are incentives against economic justice? ⋮ Let them cheat! ⋮ Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods ⋮ The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems

Cites Work

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• Room assignment-rent division: a market approach
• Games of fair division
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Bidding for envy-freeness: a procedural approach to \(n\)-player fair-division problems
• Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness