An algorithm for envy-free allocations in an economy with indivisible objects and money
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Publication:2388747
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(30)- Monotonicity and envyfree assignments
- Balancedness of permutation games and envy-free allocations in indivisible good economies
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- A derivation of the money rawlsian solution
- Almost envy-free allocations with connected bundles
- Computing envy-freeable allocations with limited subsidies
- A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget
- Fair division of mixed divisible and indivisible goods
- Constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages
- Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
- Envy-freeness in house allocation problems
- Existence of efficient envy-free allocations of a heterogeneous divisible commodity with nonadditive utilities
- Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
- Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint
- Two birds with one stone: fairness and welfare via transfers
- How to decrease the degree of envy in allocations of indivisible goods
- Envy-free divisions
- Distributed fair allocation of indivisible goods
- On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6850473 (Why is no real title available?)
- An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities
- A fair and truthful mechanism with limited subsidy
- One quarter each (on average) ensures proportionality
- Towards optimal subsidy bounds for envy-freeable allocations
- Envy-free House allocation with minimum subsidy
- Achieving envy-freeness through items sale
- Fair rent division: new budget and rent constraints
- Solving house allocation problems with risk-averse agents
- Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
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