Recommendations
- An algorithm for envy-free allocations in an economy with indivisible objects and money
- Envy-free and Pareto efficient allocations in economies with indivisible goods and money
- Refinements of the no-envy solution in economies with indivisible goods
- Are incentives against economic justice?
- Money-egalitarian-equivalent and gain-maximin allocations of indivisible items with monetary compensation
Cited in
(19)- Two birds with one stone: fairness and welfare via transfers
- Envy-free and Pareto efficient allocations in economies with indivisible goods and money
- An algorithm for envy-free allocations in an economy with indivisible objects and money
- Are incentives against economic justice?
- Money matters: an axiomatic theory of the endowment effect
- Solving house allocation problems with risk-averse agents
- An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities
- Constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages
- One quarter each (on average) ensures proportionality
- Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
- Computing envy-freeable allocations with limited subsidies
- Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
- Fully polynomial-time approximation schemes for fair rent division
- A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget
- Ricardian equivalence. Are the required assumptions defensible?
- Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
- A fair and truthful mechanism with limited subsidy
- Balancedness of permutation games and envy-free allocations in indivisible good economies
- Divide and compromise
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