Constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.09.010MaRDI QIDQ2268103zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tommy Andersson, Lars-Gunnar Svensson, Zaifu Yang

Publication date 10 March 2010

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.010

zbMATH Keywords

incentivesdynamic mechanism designjob assignmentminimum wagesnon-manipulabilityconstrained fairness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints
• Fair welfare maximization
• Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
• Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness
• Fair Groves mechanisms

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3231692 (Why is no real title available?)
• A derivation of the money rawlsian solution
• A refinement and extension of the no-envy concept
• An algorithm for envy-free allocations in an economy with indivisible objects and money
• Bidding for envy-freeness: a procedural approach to \(n\)-player fair-division problems
• Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
• Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
• Nash Implementation of Competitive Equilibria in a Model with Indivisible Goods
• No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods
• On Representatives of Subsets
• Price-Quantity Strategic Market Games
• Rental Harmony: Sperner's Lemma in Fair Division
• Some implications of an intensity measure of envy
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness

Cited in

(3)

• Fair Wages When Individual Choice Sets Are Incomplete: An Application of a Model with Indivisibilities
• Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint
• Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule

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