Rental Harmony: Sperner's Lemma in Fair Division
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Publication:2757340
DOI10.2307/2589747zbMath1010.05077OpenAlexW4246657866WikidataQ56388118 ScholiaQ56388118MaRDI QIDQ2757340
Publication date: 26 November 2001
Published in: The American Mathematical Monthly (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://scholarship.claremont.edu/hmc_fac_pub/663
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