Children crying at birthday parties. Why?
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Publication:878403
DOI10.1007/s00199-006-0109-3zbMath1114.91034WikidataQ59972784 ScholiaQ59972784MaRDI QIDQ878403
Publication date: 26 April 2007
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0109-3
91B08: Individual preferences
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