A simple and procedurally fair game form for Nash implementation of the No-envy solution

DOI10.1515/bejte-2019-0051OpenAlexW2972994405WikidataQ127243312 ScholiaQ127243312MaRDI QIDQ2099047

Makoto Hagiwara

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0051

zbMATH Keywords

Nash implementationprocedural fairnessno-envy solutionsimple game form

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

A strategic justification of the constrained equal awards rule through a procedurally fair multilateral bargaining game

Cites Work

• The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization
• Symmetric mechanism design
• Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies
• Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
• Children crying at birthday parties. Why?
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• Fair divisions as attracting Nash equilibria of simple games
• Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Divide-and-permute
• A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
• A general concept of procedural fairness for one-stage implementation
• Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• Toward Natural Implementation
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

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