Symmetric mechanism design

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.11.007zbMath1388.91095OpenAlexW2775822722MaRDI QIDQ684174

Yaron Azrieli, Ritesh Jain

Publication date: 9 February 2018

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.11.007

zbMATH Keywords

symmetryfairnessmechanism designrevelation principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Procedurally fair implementation under complete information ⋮ Symmetric mechanism design: comment ⋮ The price of `one person, one vote' ⋮ A simple and procedurally fair game form for Nash implementation of the No-envy solution

Cites Work

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• A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods
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