Symmetric mechanism design
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Publication:684174
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2017.11.007zbMATH Open1388.91095OpenAlexW2775822722MaRDI QIDQ684174FDOQ684174
Authors: Yaron Azrieli, Ritesh Jain 
Publication date: 9 February 2018
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.11.007
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Cites Work
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- Optimal Auction Design
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- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Robust Mechanism Design
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Menu-dependent preferences and revelation principle
- A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods
- Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
- Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle
- Discrimination in a model of contests with incomplete information about ability
Cited In (4)
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