Recommendations
- Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good
- Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money
- Strategy-proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
- Robust Mechanism Design
- The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle
- Discrimination in a model of contests with incomplete information about ability
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
- Menu-dependent preferences and revelation principle
- Microeconomic theory
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Optimal Auction Design
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Robust Mechanism Design
Cited in
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