Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
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Publication:4530919
DOI10.2307/2998580zbMath1019.91016OpenAlexW1984726588WikidataQ61440680 ScholiaQ61440680MaRDI QIDQ4530919
Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Tayfun Sönmez
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2998580
Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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