Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites
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Publication:1662656
DOI10.1016/j.disopt.2018.04.004zbMath1506.91116arXiv1603.00858OpenAlexW2290645672WikidataQ129453793 ScholiaQ129453793MaRDI QIDQ1662656
Bettina Klaus, David F. Manlove, Katarína Cechlárova
Publication date: 20 August 2018
Published in: Discrete Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1603.00858
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