Matching with quorums
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Publication:2440142
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.03.007zbMATH Open1284.91417OpenAlexW2030325366MaRDI QIDQ2440142FDOQ2440142
Authors: Daniel Monte, Norovsambuu Tumennasan 
Publication date: 27 March 2014
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.007
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The Hospitals/Residents Problem with Quota Lower Bounds
- Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
- Serial dictatorship and Pareto optimality
Cited In (9)
- Constrained allocation of projects to heterogeneous workers with preferences over peers
- A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures
- Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas
- Simplified group activity selection with group size constraints
- Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas
- Stable matchings with covering constraints: a complete computational trichotomy
- On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
- Matchings with lower quotas: algorithms and complexity
- Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites
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