The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
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Publication:986550
DOI10.1016/J.TCS.2010.05.005zbMATH Open1193.91099OpenAlexW1978256120MaRDI QIDQ986550FDOQ986550
Authors: Péter Biró, Tamás Fleiner, Robert W. Irving, David F. Manlove 
Publication date: 11 August 2010
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/38576/1/38576.pdf
Recommendations
NP-hardnesscollege admissions problemcommon quotaslower quotashospitals/Residents problemnested set systems
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Case-oriented studies in operations research (90B90) Matching models (91B68)
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Cited In (58)
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- Refined computational complexities of hospitals/residents problem with regional caps
- Envy-freeness and relaxed stability: hardness and approximation algorithms
- Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching
- Entering classes in the college admissions model
- Graduate admission with financial support
- Envy-free matchings with lower quotas
- The hospitals/residents problem with lower quotas
- A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures
- Dynamic reserves in matching markets
- Finding all stable matchings with couples
- Handling preferences in student-project allocation
- Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
- Envy-freeness and relaxed stability for lower-quotas: a parameterized perspective
- Many-to-one matchings without substitutability
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
- A matroid approach to stable matchings with lower quotas
- A Generalized Polymatroid Approach to Stable Matchings with Lower Quotas
- Simplified group activity selection with group size constraints
- Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- Popular matchings with lower quotas
- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
- Student admissions and faculty recruitment
- Stable matchings with covering constraints: a complete computational trichotomy
- College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach
- Modelling practical placement of trainee teachers to schools
- College admissions with stable score-limits
- Classified stable matching
- Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints
- Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits
- Stable matchings of teachers to schools
- Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
- Agreeable sets with matroidal constraints
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
- Matching with quorums
- A matroid approach to stable matchings with lower quotas
- The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints
- Envy-free matchings with one-sided preferences and matroid constraints
- Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems
- Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems
- The popular matching and condensation problems under matroid constraints
- Assignment mechanisms under distributional constraints
- Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints
- Incomplete list setting of the hospitals/residents problem with maximally satisfying lower quotas
- Refined computational complexities of hospitals/residents problem with regional caps
- Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints
- Integer programming techniques for college admission problem with common quotas
- On matchings, marriages and college admissions
- University rankings from the revealed preferences of the applicants
- Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation
- Matchings with lower quotas: algorithms and complexity
- The College Admissions Problem Revisited
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Stable matching with proportionality constraints
- Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
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