The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
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Cites work
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Cited in
(58)- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7278072 (Why is no real title available?)
- Refined computational complexities of hospitals/residents problem with regional caps
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- A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures
- Envy-free matchings with one-sided preferences and matroid constraints
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- Integer programming techniques for college admission problem with common quotas
- Handling preferences in student-project allocation
- Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas
- College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
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- Modelling practical placement of trainee teachers to schools
- College admissions with stable score-limits
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- Stable matching with proportionality constraints
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- Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints
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- Student admissions and faculty recruitment
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- Stable matchings of teachers to schools
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- The hospitals/residents problem with lower quotas
- Stable matchings with covering constraints: a complete computational trichotomy
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- Matchings with lower quotas: algorithms and complexity
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- Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits
- Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
- A matroid approach to stable matchings with lower quotas
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