A matroid approach to stable matchings with lower quotas
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Publication:2806830
DOI10.1287/MOOR.2015.0751zbMATH Open1341.91107OpenAlexW2255996700MaRDI QIDQ2806830FDOQ2806830
Tamás Fleiner, Naoyuki Kamiyama
Publication date: 19 May 2016
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/3af2425f17574e2b5d248b31783b55a06255f32b
Cites Work
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Cited In (18)
- Envy-free matchings with lower quotas
- A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures
- Pareto Stable Matchings under One-Sided Matroid Constraints
- A Generalized Polymatroid Approach to Stable Matchings with Lower Quotas
- Stable matchings with covering constraints: a complete computational trichotomy
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Reallocation mechanisms under distributional constraints in the full preference domain
- Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints
- Popular critical matchings in the many-to-many setting
- Envy-freeness and relaxed stability: hardness and approximation algorithms
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
- The popular matching and condensation problems under matroid constraints
- Popular matchings with two-sided preference lists and matroid constraints
- Popularity in the generalized hospital residents setting
- Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation
- A Matroid Generalization of the Super-Stable Matching Problem
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
- Matroidal Choice Functions
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