A matroid approach to stable matchings with lower quotas
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1757951 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
- Characterization of stable matchings as extreme points of a polytope
- Classified stable matching
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Linear programming brings marital bliss
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Stable and crossing structures
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
- The hospitals/residents problem with lower quotas
Cited in
(23)- Envy-free matchings with lower quotas
- Strongly stable matchings under matroid constraints
- Efficient and strategy-proof mechanism under general constraints
- A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures
- Super-stable common independent sets of generalized matroids
- A Generalized Polymatroid Approach to Stable Matchings with Lower Quotas
- A matroid generalization of the super-stable matching problem
- Stable matchings with covering constraints: a complete computational trichotomy
- Matroidal choice functions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7278072 (Why is no real title available?)
- Classified stable matching
- Reallocation mechanisms under distributional constraints in the full preference domain
- Pareto stable matchings under one-sided matroid constraints
- Popular critical matchings in the many-to-many setting
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
- Envy-freeness and relaxed stability: hardness and approximation algorithms
- A matroid approach to stable matchings with lower quotas
- The popular matching and condensation problems under matroid constraints
- Popular matchings with two-sided preference lists and matroid constraints
- Popularity in the generalized hospital residents setting
- Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation
- Stable matching with proportionality constraints
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
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